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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.
DAVID CARL REED,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20050670-CA

:
INTRODUCTION

This Court should reverse Reed's conviction for attempted child kidnapping
because the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, was
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he made a substantial step toward the
commission of child kidnapping.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT REED
WAS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED CHILD KIDNAPPING
As explained in Reed's opening brief, in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he "engage[d] in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission o f child
kidnapping, the State had to show his conduct "strongly corroborate)^]" either his
"conscious objective or desire" to seize, confine, detain, or transport Ashley Poike
(Poike) without authority of law or the consent of her parents, or that he acted "with an

awareness that his conduct [was] reasonably certain" to result in seizing, confining,
detaining, or transporting Poike without authority of law or the consent of her parents.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(l)-(2) (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(b) (Supp.
2005); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1) (2003); see Aplt. Br. at 19-20. The marshaled
evidence, however, was "so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt'" that Reed's conduct constituted a substantial
step toward child kidnapping. State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,TJ10, 2 P.3d 954
(citations omitted); see Aplt. Br. at 13-17 (marshaled evidence).
Assuming Reed opened the car door and said "Get in," as Poike claimed, the fatal
flaw in the evidence is that he did so from half a city block away. Reed did not stop "a
bit ahead o f Poike. See Rspt. Br. at 11. He stopped half a city block away from her at a
stop sign. R. 226:26-28, 36-38, 77, 81-83; State's Exhibit 7. As poignantly demonstrated
by State's Exhibit 7, the idea that, from that distance, Reed acted with a "conscious
objective or desire" to kidnap Poike or "with an awareness that his conduct was
reasonably certain" to result in kidnapping Poike is so inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2103(l)-(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-10l(l)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1); R.
State's Exhibit 7.
As explained in his opening brief, Reed had plenty of opportunity to try to kidnap
Poike, if that was his intent. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. He was directly across the street from
her the first time he stopped and, following his U-turn, he drove right past her. R.
226:24-26, 33, 36, 77, 81-82. But he did not induce her to get into the car from either of
2

these vantage points. Id. Instead, he waited until he was half a city block away and
stopped at a stop sign. R. 226:26-28, 36-38, 77, 81-83; State's Exhibit 7. To have
committed child kidnapping from that position, Reed would have had to, at the very least,
get out of the car, display some kind offeree or weapon, or otherwise threaten or chase
Poike. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991) (holding evidence
insufficient to establish substantial step toward first degree murder where it showed
defendant purchased counterfeit crank but did not show she attempted to administer it to
her husband). Anything less would not have represented a substantial step because it
could not reasonably have been expected to induce a 12-year old girl to abandon her
plans and her "pretty big" dog; run half a city block past six houses, at least one of which
belonged to a friend of hers; and get into a stranger's vehicle without crying out or
otherwise drawing attention to herself. R. 226:26, 29-30, 36, 41, 44, 48, 77, 81-83;
State's Exhibit 7. Thus, Reed's simple act of opening the car door and saying "Get in,"
did not constitute a substantial step toward the commission of child kidnapping. See id.
Further, even assuming "lying in wait, searching for or following" a person
constitutes a substantial step as defined by Utah's attempt statute, the jury made no
finding that Reed lay in wait, searched for, or followed Poike. See Rspt. Br. at 10
(quoting Model Penal Code §5.01(2) (2002)). The State did not argue Reed was guilty of
attempted child kidnapping because he lay in wait, searched for, or followed Poike;
rather, it argued Reed was guilty of attempted child kidnapping because he opened the
car door from half a city block away and told Poike to get in. R. 227:43 (prosecutor
noting "key point" is "the part about opening the car door and telling [Poike] to get in"),
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45-47 (prosecutor arguing Poike's statement that Reed opened car door and said "Get in"
satisfied elements of attempted child kidnapping). Accordingly, the jury did not consider
whether Reed lay in wait, searched for, or followed Poike. Id. Instead, it decided only
whether Reed opened the door and said "Get in" and, if so, whether such actions
constituted a substantial step toward child kidnapping. R. 227:50-51 (defense counsel
explaining "case boils down to" whether jury was "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . that [Reed] opened the car door and told [Poike] to get in," and those actions were
"substantial step towards accomplishing the goal of kidnapping a child"). Thus, the
question before this Court is not whether there was sufficient evidence to show Reed lay
in wait, searched for, or followed Poike, but whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding that Reed's act of opening the car door and saying "Get in"
constituted a substantial step toward the commission of child kidnapping.
Thus, this Court should reverse because there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction for attempted child kidnapping. Instead, as explained in Reed's opening
brief, this Court should enter a conviction for attempted lewdness involving a child, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (2003) and Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-101. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003).

CONCLUSION
Reed respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for attempted child
kidnapping, and to enter a judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of
attempted lewdness involving a child.
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SUBMITTED this 2 3 ^ a y of March, 2006.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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